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PREFACE

The battle for Lw6w in November of 1918 is a topic scarcely
covered by Western historiography, as well as Ukrainian historiography
wri t ten in the English language.

The Polish-'Ukrainian War of

1918--1919, particularly its diplomatic implications, is extensively
covered in numerous sources of American, English, French, Polish, and
Ukrainian origin written in the English language

However, the

November battle for Lw6w itself is relegated in these texts to a
few sentences at most.
The only detailed Ukrainian study in the English language that I
found on this subject is the two··volume study "Western Ukraine at the
Turning Point of Europe's History 1918··1923" by Matthew Stachiw and
Jaroslaw Sztendera.

The information found in this book, however, is

only specific and descriptive when pertaining to Ukrainian political
activities, while it is simply vague when concerned with the military
aspects of the battle for Lw6w.
Revolution 1917··1920:

John S. Reshetar's "The Ukrainian

A Study in Nationalism" describes the Lw6w

struggle in only one sentence on page 230, while Clarence A. Manning
summarizes it on pages 57-59 of his "Twentieth-Century Ukraine."
Other Ukrainian or pro-Ukrainian studies fail to cover this event
at all.

Lack of knowledge of the Ukrainian language prevented me

from researching publications written in that language.
Primary and secondary Polish sources on the Polish-Ukrainian
conflict in Lw6w during November of 1918 served as my major research
materials.

The primary sources were of special quality and

significance.

The two-volume "Obrona Lwowa:

Zr6dla do dziej6w walk

o Lw6w i wojew6dztwa poludniowo"wschodnie 1918-1920" ("Defense of
Lw6w:

Sources to the History of the Struggles for Lw6w and the
ii
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Southeastern Provinces") was first published between 1933 and 1939.
I used a revised edition published between 1991 and 1993.

This

remarkably informative study contains the memoirs of nearly every
Polish commanding officer and political official that participated
in the battle for LWDW, as well as additional documents concerning
this struggle.

"Semper Fidelis:

wsp61czesnych" ("Semper Fidelis:

Obrona Lwowa w obrazach
The Defense of Lw6w in Contemporary

Pictures") is the most complete collection of photographs documenting
the Polish-Ukrainian War that has ever been published.

With over

700 photographs, it is the major source of illustrations for nearly
every book that has been published concerning this war.

It contains

descriptions of the photographs and informative summaries in Polish,
English, and French.

The newspaper "Pobudka" ("Reveille") is a

daily that was published by the Polish Army irregularly between
November 6, 1918 and January of 1919.

Because of the short length of time

this Lw6w newspaper was in circulation and the war-torn environment
under which it was published, i t i s indeed a very rare periodical.
I was able to research the following issues of "Pobudka:"

December 7,

la, II, 22, 23, 24, and 28, 1918; January 4 and 5, 1919; and the
special commemorative edition published on November 22, 1919.

In

addition to news reports, official Polish military announcements,
and documents that would be particularly useful in researching the
December 1918-January 1919 period of the Polish-Ukrainian struggle,
"Pobudko" also contains articles, memoirs, interviews (e.g., with
Wladyslaw Sikorski), documents, and statistics that were of immense
value to my work.
In addition to,primary Polish sources, I found three Polish or
pro-'Polish secondary sources to be of irreplaceable quality.
Rosa Bailly's "A City Fights for Freedom:
iii
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1918--1919" is an in-depth study which combines a variety of Polish
memoirs and documents, along with Ukrainian studies, to form a
cohesive and descriptive chronicle of the Polish-Ukrainian War,
especially the events of November 1918.

In his "Wojsko Polskie i

operacje wojenne lat 1918-,1921" ("The Polish Army and the Hili tary
Operations of 1918-1921"), Mieczyslaw Wrzosek investigates in specific
detail each one of the numerous struggles Poland faced during its
first years of independence.

"Wojna polsko-ukrainska 1918-1919"

("The Polish-·Ukrainian War 1918-1919") by Grzegorz tukomski, Czeslaw
Partacz, and Boguslaw Polak was especially useful for its careful
researching of the origins of the war, as well as its day-'by-day
chronicle of events that occurred from November 1, 1918 to September 1,
1919 in Lw6w, East Galicia, and Volhynia.
It is important to point out the transliteration format of
Ukrainian names included in this work.

I used the spelling of

Ukrainian names presented in "Western Ukraine at the Turning Point
of Europe's History 1918-1923" by Stachiw and Sztendera.

Since this

is the transliteration desired by the Shevchenko Scientific Society,
the oldest and most influential Ukrainian intellectual institution,
and because it allows for a correct phonetic pronunciation of
Ukrainian names, I found it more accurate than standard
transliterations of Russian to English or the spelling arrangements
used in other Ukrainian sources and in Polish studies.

The rules

for transliteration of the Ukrainian language to English, according
to the Shevchenko Scientific Society, are explained on page 6 in
volume I of the above mentioned book.
This work is dedicated to the memory of my dearly departed
grandmother, Janina Artymowska-'Zabiega (1895-1985).

As a medical

student at the University of Lw6w, she volunteered for service in the
iv
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Polish Army during the Polish-Ukrainian War of 1918-1919.

December 20, 1918 and June 30, 1919, my grandmother served as a
courier for the City Citizens' Guard (MSO), at a time when Lw6w was
besieged by the Ukrainian Army.

Janina Artymowska-Zabiega was

awarded the "Eaglets" Medal (officially called the Defenders of the
Eastern Borderlands Medal) and the MSO Merit Medal.

She also received

a letter of commendation from General Waclaw Iwaszkiewicz. the
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Polish commander in East Galicia from March of 1919 (who later
successfully defended southeastern Poland against the Soviet invasion.
of 1920).

The "Pobudka" newspapers and the photographic study

"Semper Fidelis:

Obrona Lwowa w obrazach wsp6lczesnych" she left my

father were of irreplaceable value to my work.
I wish to express my sincere· gratitude to Professor Edward J .
O'Day from the Department of History at Southern Illinois, University
at Carbondale.

His helpful suggestions and advice proved particularly

meaningful when organizing the structure and style of my paper.
I also extend my deepest gratitude to Mr. Rudolf Veit, President of
the Kolo Lwowian (Circle of Lwowians) in Chicago and one of the most
energetic propagators of Lwdw and Poland in the world today.
By entrusting me with priceless books from his personal collection.
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such as the already mentioned study by Rosa Bailly and J6zefa
Ml;!karska's

"W~dr6wka

poZiemiach Wschodnich Rzeczypospolitej"

("A Trip Across the Eastern Lands of the Republic of Poland") •
Mr. Veit provided precious research tools for my work.

I would like to

thank Dr. Janusz Cisek, Director of the J6zef Pilsudski Institute of
America in New York. for his recommendations on useful sources for
my work and his invitation to research the Institute's immense
archives. which I was unable to take advantage of due to financial
restraints.

However, Wrzosek's previously mentioned work and

v

I
I
I
I
I

I'

I
I
I
I

"Kalendarium zycia J6zefa Pilsudskiego" ("Calendar of the Life of
J6zef Pilsudski") co-authored by Waclaw J~drzejewicz and Dr. Cisek
himself were valuable assets to my work, as Dr. Cisek had suggested.
Lastly, I would like to thank the members of my family.
parents, Andrzej and Helena Zabiega, and my sister, Malgorzata
Zabiega, have always encouraged my historical interests and were
especially supportive during the writing of this work.

My interest

in Polish-Ukrainian relations and the pre-World War II era in Poland
was stimulated by my dearly departed grandfather, Stanislaw Baran
(1910-1990), a peasant and railway worker in the Bieszczady region of
Poland (bordering between East
River).

~nd

West Galicia, next to the San

His experiences and insight on pre-1939 Polish politics

and the relationship between the coexisting Polish and Ukrainian
nationalities were truly remarkable.
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I.

Introduction·
From November 1 to November 22, 1918, the city of Lw6w (currently

a part of Ukraine) was the center of a bloody conflict between Poles
and Ukrainians that has been largely overlooked by Western historians.
Though the entire Polish-Ukrainian War was fought from November of
1918 to August of 1919 over the large provinces of East Galicia and
VQlhynia (constituting what is today the entire western part of
Ukraine and a small part of southeastern Poland), the most memorable
battle was the one for Lw6w at the onset of this war.

Both the Poles

and Ukrainians were willing to compromise over territorial disputes,
but neither side was capable of relinquishing its perceived right to
Lw6w.
The city under discussion here is known under several different
names.

Poles call it Lw6w, Ukrainians know it as Lviv, Russians have

named it Lvov, under Austrian rule it was officially Lemberg, and its
Latin title was Leopolis.

In each case, the city's name can be

roughly translated as "of lions" or "of lion", hence the title of this
work.

The author will refer to the city as Lw6w because of the fact

that Poland has ruled the city for the longest period of time.
Lwow is found in the watershed line between the Vistula and
Dniester rivers,1 while the only river running through the city, the
Peltew, was canalized at the start of the twentieth century to
actually run underneath Lw6w. 2 Interestingly, the city is found
almost exactly halfway between the Baltic and Black seas.

3

Lw6w is

built on a set of seven hills overlooking the surrounding area, and
thus one of the Italian citizens of Lw6w compared its similar
geography to that of his hometown of Florence, a comparison that
Lwowians were proud to bring up now and then. 4
1
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Whereas Lw6w's geography was peculiar, its multicultural
environment could only be described as remarkable.

It was inhabited

predominantly by Poles, whose culture was also the most influential.
The city, in addition, constituted one of the main centers of
Ukrainian, Jewish, and Armenian cultural life.

These four national

and ethnic groups had been living together since the foundation of
Lw6w and they were later joined by Italians, Greeks, Hungarians,
Tartars, Englishmen, and Scotsmen, who were sincerely welcomed by the
prospering city.

5

These different cultures blended. into the Polish

dialect of Lw6w, called the balak, which was a musical idiom whose
features were used even by the intelligentsia of Lw6w, an uncommon
occurrence among the intellectual elites of major European cities.

6

Lw6w's multiculturalism was accompanied by a multitude of religious
influences.

It served as the seat of a Roman Catholic archbishopric,

as well as Uniate and Armenian ones.

Furthermore, Lw6w contained an

Eastern Orthodox Church, Lutheran Church, and two synagogues.

7

In order to understand the basis of a conflict between two
nations, it is helpful to look at statistics concerning the population
of the disputed area.

It must be pointed out that Poles were

predominantly, but not exclusively, Roman Catholic.

The Ukrainians in

East Galicia, meanwhile, were predominantly, though again not
exclusively, members of the Uniate Church (a Catholic religion similar
in custom and ritual to Eastern Orthodoxy, but recognizing the
authority of the Vatican, with the Pope as Head of the Church).

In

East Galicia, according to the official 1910 Austrian census, out of
the over five million people living the.re,8 Ukrainians constituted

9

59 percent of the population, Poles-27 percent, Jews--13percent, and
in all of Galicia there were only 1392 Armenians.

10

This statistic

became the cornerstone of the Ukrainian arguments demanding that
2
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East Galicia be recognized as a possession of an independent Ukraine.
This data, however, was an oversimplified answer to an extremely
complex question.

First of all, Lw6w (population of 206,574

11

), the

capital of Galicia and the city that the Ukrainians were unwilling to
relinquish, had a clear Polish majority.

According to the previously

mentioned Austrian census, 61.4 percent of Lw6w's population was
Polish, 27.8 percent-Jewish, and 10:8 percent-mcrainian.

Moreover,

Poles were the majority in the area around Lw6w and in almost all the
East Galician cities.

12

Poles were the majority in the westernmost

part of East Galicia (next to the San River), but also in a large area
in the easternmost part next to the Zbrucz River.

Finally, except

for the southeastern part, most of East Galicia contained a Polish
minority constituting between 33 and 50 percent of the population.

13

What should be stressed now are the other non-historical factors
which played a role in each nation's quest for rule in East Galicia
and Lw6w.

Lw6w was the center of Ukrainian nationalism, the place

where Ukrainian national thought and culture bore the ripest fruit.
One of the Poles' major arguments in defense of their rights to
Lw6w was that, as the Polish historian Iwo Cyprian Pogonowski stated
it simply, "Llv6w was producing the largest number of Polish
scientists and literary figures.,,14
In discussing the history of Lw6w and East Galicia, it must be
pointed out that the Ukrainian nation did not develop from its Russian
r.oots until the sixteenth century A.D.

The territory later' called

East Galicia was a part of Poland until 981, when Vladimir the Great
of Russia invaded and occupied it.

15

Until the Hongol invasions of

the thirteenth century that destroyed the original Kiev Russian state,
East Galicia was occupied back and forth by Poland and Russia.

ln8t

The

remnant of the old Russian state remained in Halicz (which the

3

I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I

Hungarians spelled Galicia) covering East Galicia and western Volhynia.
Halicz's greatest ruler, Daniel Romanovich, founded the city of Lw6w
(which he named after his son and successor Lev).

After the death of

Daniel in 1264 and the extinction of his dynasty in 1323, rule over
Halicz passed to a Polish prince, Boleslaw of Mazovia, and after his
death in 1340, to King Casimir the Great of Poland.
Casimir the Great ordered the construction of numerous cities,
castles, churches, and fortresses in East Galicia, expanding
substantially the size of Lw6w.
Poland for almost 400 years.
centuries, Poland

The city would remain a part of

During the sixteenth and seventeenth

fought numerous wars with the Cossacks, made up of

adventurers and runaway serfs, who were the precursor to the modern
Ukrainian nation.

In 1772, during the first partition of Poland by

Russia, Prussia, and Austria, LWDW and East Galicia were annexed by
Austria.

Poland was erased from the map of Europe by further

partitions in 1793 and 1795.
Polish nationalism, however, surged in the nineteenth century.
The cultural, literary, political, and social progress of that century
among the Poles consolidated all classes of Polish society in the
movement for the independence of Poland.

Poles resisted foreign

occupation by staging several uprisings and numerous conspi.racies.
The Poles were treated differently by the three powers occupying their
country.

The Prussians (and later Germans) and Russians brutally

repressed all forms of Polish cultural and political life, attempting
to Germanize and Russianize the Poles respectively.

The Austrians

were partially restrictive until the Compromise of 1867, which
established the dualist state of Austro-Hungary and gave the national
minorities equal cultural and political rights in Austria.

From 1867,

the Poles (the largest minority in the Austrian part of Austro-Hungary)

4
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controlled the province of Galicia, were a prominent force in the
Austrian Reichsrat (parliament), and served in the Austro··Hungarian
government (as Prime Ministers, Foreign Ministers, Finance Ministers,
and lower cabinet posts).

Polish cultural life in Galicia flourished

and Polish intellectual advancement was secured through the Polishcontrolled universities of Krak6w and Lw6w.
The nineteenth century also saw the blossoming of the Ukrainians
into a nation conscious of its distinct character.

Unlike the Polish

movement, which was a mass endeavor of thousands of activists and
millions of people dreaming of an independent Poland, the Ukrainian
movement consisted of a small group of intellectuals and clergymen
who developed Ukrainian national identity among the peasant masses.

16

As in the case of the Poles, Ukrainian cultural and political life
was repressed in Russian-occupied territories.

The Ukrainians found

a safe haven for their cultural, political, and social activities
in the freedom of the Austrian province of Galicia.

The Ukrainian

national movement especially gained momentum after 1890, when the
Polish administration of Galicia gave the Ukrainians numerous rights
and privileges.

By the turn of the century, however, the Ukrainians,

led by the Ukrainian National Democratic Party (UNDP), began to
organize numerous strikes and protests in Galicia.

Their activities

culminated in the assassination of the Polish Governor of Galicia,
Count Andrzej Potocki, by a Ukrainian student in 1908.

Finally, in

early 1914, the Poles and Ukrainians reached a compromise by which
Ukrainian representation in Galicia's government was substantially
increased.

World War I, unfortunately, resulted in the formation of

even greater antagonisms between the two nations.
Freedom and independence were the most beneficial results of the
tirst World War.

These two ideals were not the war aims that

5
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either the Central Powers or the Entente were seeking, but from the
blood and gun-powder of World War I rose a tremendous number of
independent European states, among them Poland and Ukraine.

The

Polish political scene had developed two political movements opposite
in ideology, but equally determined to rebuild a great Poland:

the

Polish Socialist Party (PPS), led by J6zef Pilsudski, and the National
Democrats (ND), led by Roman Dmowski.

Aware that a war between

Austro'-Hungary and Russia would break out soon, the Poles organized
legal and clandestine paramilitary organizations which by 1914
consisted of about 22,000 members.

17

From these organizations and

further recruits, the Austrian military authorities allowed the Poles
to organize the Polish Legions.

By the end of 1915, the Legions

consisted of three brigades and fought several successful battles
against the Russians.

Meanwhile, J6zef Pilsudski decided in the fall

of 1914 to organize a secret military organization that would become
instrumental in Poland's fight for independence, the Polish Military
Organization (POW).
The Central Powers had great military success on the Eastern
Front.

By the summer of 1915, their armies had occupied most of

Russian Poland.

The Poles, however, had become disenchanted with the

Central Powers, which did not offer them any hope for an independent
Poland.

In 1916, Piisudski resigned from ihe Polish Legions in protest

to the anti"Polish Central Powers' policy, while the Legions themselves
were transformed into the Polish Auxiliary Corps, and later the
Polnische Wehrmacht under direct German command.

After refusing to

take an oath of allegiance to the Austro-Hungarian and German Emperors,
Pilsudski was arrested in June of 1917 and imprisoned in Magdeburg,
Germany.

Members of the Legions and the POW were either imprisoned

or forced into the regular Austro-ffungarian Army.

6

The Germans set up
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a three-man Regency Council, which was allowed to form a Polish
government and maintained a high degree of autonomy by, for example,
refusing to declare war against the Entente.

18

As a result of the February Revolution of 1917 in Russia, Tsar
Nicholas II was overthrown and a Russian Provisional Government was
established.

The new government announced on March 30, 1917 the

"creation of an independent Polish state.,,19·
the activity of the Polish

Nationa~

This was a stimulus to

Council established in western

Europe by Roman Dmowski and the world-famous pianist and composer
Ignacy Jan Paderewski.

They could now persuade the Entente to support

an independent Poland.

On January 22, 1917, the United States

President Woodrow Wilson (influenced by Paderewski) publicly endorsed
"a united, independent, and autonomous Poland.·

20

Point 13 of

Wilson's famous Fourteen Points called for the establishment of a
politically and economically independent Poland with access to the
Baltic Sea. 21

Between December of 1917 and January of 1918, Italy,

France, and Great Britain publicly asserted their support for an
independent Poland. 22
The major Ukrainian movements during World War I sided with the
Central Powers.

The Ukrainians in _East Galicia organized a 600-man

detachment of Ukrainian Sich Sharpshooters (USS) which fought
alongside the Austro-Hungarian Army until it was forced to surrender
to Russian forces in June of 1917. 23

After the February Revolution in

Russia, the Ukrainian political movements established a Central
Ukrainian Rada (Council) in Kiev.

At first calling only for an

autonomous Ukrainian state within the Russian Empire, the Rada
proclaimed a completely independent Ukrainian People's Republic on
January 22, 1918 and sent a delegation to the Brest-Litovsk talks
between the Central Powers and Bolshevik Russia.

7
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At Brest-Litovsk, in return for the Central Powers' access to
Ukrainian grain and other natural resources of that fertile land, the
Ukrainians demanded that the new Ukrainian state be given the Chelm
(Kholm) region of Russian Poland, as well as East Galicia and
Bukovina. 24 The Ukrainian delegates finally settled for just Chelm
with Ukrainian autonomous rule in East Galicia, as well as recognition
of Ukraine's independence by the Central Powers.

On February 9, 1918,

the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk between the Central Powers and the
ffi,rainian People's Republic was signed.

Since by that time the

Bolsheviks had occupied Kiev, the Ukrainians pleaded for German
military support for their threatened country.

The German Army

invaded Ukraine in the spring of 1918, overthrew the Rada, and set
u'p a new fficrainian government in Kiev with Pavlo Skoropadskyy as
He tman (leader).
The Poles, in the meanwhile, reacted swiftly and decisively to
the decisions rendered at Brest-Litovsk.

The region of Chelm had a

clear Polish majority and consisted of a substantial part of modern-'
day southeastern Poland.

Under pressure from the Regency Council,

prominent Polish political figures, and mass protests, the Central
Powers persuaded the Ukrainians to surrender their copy of the treaty
to the care of the Central Powers ..

Subsequently, all copies of the

protocol concerning Chelm were burned by the German Foreign Office
in Berlin, thereby nullifying this controversial part of the Treaty
of Brest-Litovsk. 25
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II.

The Ukrainian Takeover

By the fall of 1918, both the Ukrainians and the Poles were
sensing the defeat of the Central Powers and the disintegration of
Austro-Hungary.
Galicia.

Both nations prepared for 'a takeover in Lw6w and East

The Poles, however, unwisely disregarded the possibility of

a Ukrainian

coup-d'~tat

in Lw6w.

The Ukrainians, therefore, had the

element of surprise in their favor, and they effectively took
advantage of it.
The Austrians, cognizant of the fact that they were losing World
War I, attempted desperately to preserve the unity of the AustroHungarian Empire.

On October 16, 1918, Emperor Karl I issued a

manifesto in which he promised the formation of a new Austrian empire,
a federation of the different nations within Austria under his scepter.
It was, however, too late.
their independence.

On October 28, 1918, the Czechs declared

On October 30, the German members of the

Reichsrat proclaimed German Austria an independent state, while the
Hungarians proclaimed their independence on November 3.

On November

11, World War I ended with the signing of an armistice between Germany
and the Entente.

That very same day Emperor Karl I abdicated.

The Habsburg dynasty and empire had ceased to exist.
It was during that fateful October of 1918 that the Ukrainians
in East Galicia were preparing for a takeover.

On October 18,

Ukrainian delegates to the Reichsrat and the provincial legislatures
of Galicia and Bukovina met in Lw&w to set up a Ukrainian National
Council (UNR).

Under the leadership of Yevhen Petrushevych, the

leader of the Ukrainian parliamentary group in the Reichsrat, the UNR
proclaimed the formation of an independent Ukrainian state.

The

territories that were to be incorporated into this new state consisted
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of East Galicia (between the San and Zbrucz Rivers), the part of West
Galicia inhabited by the Lemko nationality (most of the Carpathian
Mountain region of West Galicia), northwestern Bukovina (bordering
with Romania), and the Subcarpathian Rus region of northern Hungary.
No decisions were rendered concerning its relationship with the
already existing independent Ukraine under Hetman Skoropadskyy.26
On October 23, an executive committee of the UNR was established under
the leadership of Petrushevych, which was to convene in Vienna.

Kost

Levytskyy was left in Lw6w as the executive committee's chief
delegate for East Galicia. 27
In light of the fact that the Poles would not give up their right
to Lw6w and East Galicia without a struggle, the Ukrainians began
mobilizing a substantial military force in the region, especially in
Lw6w.

They were helped by the Austrian military authorities, who

expected Galicia to be eventually divided into an eastern Ukrainian
and western Polish part.

From early 1918 to the end of October of

that year, Austro"Hungarian military units with a large percentage of
fficrainians were assigned to East Galicia, while units where Poles
predominated were transferred to either the Italian Front or to other
provinces of Austro-Hungary.

Out of about 20,000 troops in Lw6w

during late October, apprOXimately 12,000 were Ukrainians, the rest
being primarily Austrians and Hungarians.

The Ukrainians were also

hoping to transfer the newly reinstated Ukrainian Sich Sharpshooters
(USS) from Bukovina to East Galicia. The USS consisted of 3000 28
well-trained soldiers under the command of the Austrian Archduke
Wilhelm Habsburg (called Vasyl Vishivani by the Ukrainians), a member
of the royal family fascinated with the Ukrainian nation. 29
In need of a military leader to command the Ukrainian troops
during the planned takeover, the Western Ukrainian government brought
10
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in an officer stationed with the USS, the 3l-year--old Captain Dmytro
Vitovslcyy.
takeover.

Vitovskyy feared that the Poles would preempt a

Ukrainian

He was strengthened in his suspicions by visits of

prominent Polish political figures in Lw6w during the last days of
October.

During the night of October 3l-November 1, the Ukrainians

interned the Austrian Governor of Galicia Karl von IIuyn and the
Austrian military commander General Pfeffer.

They occupied most of

the administrative and strategic points in Lw6w.

Polish soldiers of

the Austro-Hungarian garrison in Lw6w were disarmed.

At dawn, the

citizens of Lw6w found themselves in a city filled with yellow and
blue Ukrainian flags and Ukrainian military patrols on almost
every street .
The Poles were ready by October of 1918 to establish a fully
independent Poland.

On October 7, the Regency Council announced the

formation of an independent Poland "consisting of all Polish lands
with access to the sea."30

Without any resistance from the German and

Austro-Hungarian armies still occupying Poland, the Regency Council
established on October 12 its jurisdiction over the Polish Army.

On

October 28, the Polish Liquidation Commission (PKL) was organized in
Krak6w, with Wincenty Witos (leader of the Polish Populist Party-a peasant rights party) as its president.

The PKL was to ensure the

establishment and administering of Polish rule in Galicia.

On the

night of October 30-31, Polish soldiers under the command of Polish
Legions Colonel Boles1~w Roja took control of the city of Kralc6w,
disarming the Austro-Hungarian army units stationed there.

Austrian

garrisons in other West Galician cities were also disarmed.
Lw6w was the Poles' next target.

The City Council of Lw6w

announced on October 20 its readiness to serve a newly independent
3l
On October 27,
Poland under the leadership of the Regency Council.
11
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the Regency Council appointed General Stanislaw Puchalski to the post
of military commander in East Galicia, with the highest ranking
Polish officer in Lw6w at the time, Colonel Wladyslaw Sikorski, as
his chief of staff.

The 37-year-old Sikorski, one of the main

organizers of the Polish Legions, departed for the fortress city of
Przemy~l

(90 kilometers west of Lw6w) on October 30 to meet with

General Puchalski.

He was scheduled to retUJ;n to Lw6won November 1.

Wincenty Witos, as well as Stanislaw

Gl~bihski,

Minister of Education

in the Regency Council's government, arrived in Lw6w in the last days
of October to talk to Governor Huyn and the City Council about
establishing a Polish administration in Lw6w and East Galicia.

Both

. left on the night of October 31 suspecting the Ukrainians were
planning a takeover, despite assurances from Huyn and the Austrian
police commander that there was no threat from the Ukrainians. 32
Since Lw6w was to be handed over to the Polish Liquidation Commission,
which was to set up its headquarters there on November 2,33 Witos and
Gl~bihski

apparently assumed the Polish takeover would precede any

mcrainian plans.
In the meanwhile, the Polish cause was particularly impaired by
a divided military in Lw6w.
associations' in Lw6w:

There were three Polish military

the Polish Military Organization (POW), the

Polish Military Cadres (PKW), and the Polish Auxiliary Corps (PKP).
The POW was a leftist organization loyal to pilsudslci and consisted
in Lw6w of 300 members, mostly former Polish Legionnaires, but also
forty women and eighty high school students.

It was commanded by

27-year-old First Lieutenant Ludwik de Laveaux, a former officer of
the Polish Legions.

The PKW was composed of 200 members politically

linked with the National Democrats and Witos' Polish Populist Party.34
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It was under the command of a captain of the Austrian reserves,
37-year-old Czeslaw

Finally, the PKP, commanded by

M,czy~ski.

Colonel Sikorski, consisted predominantly of soldiers from the Second
Brigade of the Polish Legions which had turned against the AustroHungarian Army after the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, between the Central
Powers and Ukraine, was publicly announced.

They were interned in

prison camps by the Austrians and not released until late October.
Under the auspices of the Regency Council, the PKP, with approximately
200 members, considered itself as the legitimate Polish Army in Lw6w.

35

It is easy to calculate from the above information that the Poles
had about 700 soldiers, possessing among themselves only 64 rifles.

36

The only organized group of Polish troops was sta'tioned in the
Sienkiewicz School on the west side of Lw6w under the command of
Polish Legions Captain Zdzislaw

Tatar-Trze~niowski.

It consisted of

eighty-six members of the PKP,37 armed with only two pistols overall.

38

On October 31, the leaders of the mentioned Polish military groups
discussed the situation in Lw6w in a series of frantic meetings,
initiated by the POW commander Laveaux.

Laveaux vigorously called for

the Polish organizations to unite and prevent the Ukrainian takeover.
He had received reports from POW members, especially agents with the
Austrian intelligence service, that the Ukrainians were preparing for
a coup-d'Atat.

He prepared the POW for a preemptive attack on the

evening of October 31.
nor Captain Antoni

Nei ther Captain M,czynski, the PKW commander,

Kami~ski

of the PKP (Sikorski's temporary

replacement), however, believed that a Ukrainian takeover would ever
take place. 39

Finally, Laveaux was warned by the other officers at the

meeting not to start any military strikes with his

pow.

M.czy~ski

recommended reconvening the officers' meeting the next morning.

40

Though Laveaux was right in calling for a preemptive occupation
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of Lw6w, it is doubtful whether a scattered force of 700 Poles would
have succeeded against a formidable army of 12,000 Ukrainians.
Certainly the Poles would have acquired much needed guns and ammunition
by occupying the Austro"Uungarian Army' s·storage facilities and could
have manned some key strategic points.

offensive military action to succeed, .especially in a vast city like
Lw6w, numbers become crucial.

withstanding a total occupation of Lw6w by the overwhelming Ukrainian
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I
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on the Polish side.
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The Polish forces, concentrated in a

few defensive positions, had a significantly better chance of

Army.

.'

On the other hand, for an

What, in fact, proved to be of utmost importance to the Polish

cause was the astounding number of Poles who volunteered for service
This included workers and peasants, aristocrats

and paupers, men and women.

Of fundamental value were the students of

the city's University and Technical University, as well as numerous
teenagers and high school students (some as young as 13).

What can be

classified as a unique phenomenon in comparison to other conflicts in
the world at the time was that in Lwbw the Polish female soldiers not
only served as couriers, nurses, and cooks, but many of them fought on
the front lines of the Polish-Uk.rainian I,ar as part of the Volunteer
41
Women's Legion, under the command of Aleksandra Zag6rska-Bitschan.
Unfortunately for the Ukrainian cause, not all the Ukrainian
soldiers stationed in Lw6w's Austro··Uungarian garrison were willing
to serve in the new Ukrainian Army.

Therefore, Captain Vitovskyy

(advanced shortly to Colonel in the new Ukrainian Army) had to his
disposal only about 4000 troops.42

This, nonetheless, was still

substantially more than the Poles could at first muster.
IDcrainians also controlled all of the armories in Lwbw.

The
They were,

however, disadvantaged in one key area of military tactics.

The

Ukrainian soldiers were entirely unfamiliar with Lw6w and the strategy
14
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of urban fighting, since most of them came from the villages of East
Galicia.
Lw6w.

43

They felt uneasy among the hostile Polish population of

In contrast, the Polish soldiers, mostly natives of Lw6w, knew

every district and street of the city.

They could even find their

way in pitch darkness and were often able to surprise the Ukrainians.

III.

Lw6w Split in Two:

November 1-12, 1918

In the early hours of November I, 1918, the first news of the
Ukrainian takeover in Lw6w reached the ears of the Polish commanders.
Immediately, a handful of Polish troops from the Sienkiewicz School,
under the command of Lieutenant Tadeusz Feldstein and armed with only
one pistol, was dispatched to confiscate guns from the local police
station.

The acquired rifles, less than thirty in all, allowed the

Poles in the Sienkiewicz School to withstand the first Ukrainian
onslaught at 10 a.m.

44

Members of the Polish military groups, as well

as numerous other volunteers, began to gather in the Sienkiewicz School
and other Polish outposts on the west side of Lw6w.
M~czy6ski

Captain Czeslaw

was agreed upon by the officers as the commander of the

Polish Army in Lw6w.

The Polish National Committee, led by Tadeusz

Cie6ski, began functioning as the Polish civilian administration.
The Poles were still desperately short of weapons.

The only

supply came from teenage boys who would surprise unsuspecting
individual Ukrainian soldiers by tripping or otherwise knocking them
down, then qUickly stealing their pistols' or rifles and running off.
Captain'Trze~niowski left

the Sienkiewicz School with a portion of its

garrison to retrieve armaments stored in the local village of
Polska just west of Lw6w.

45

Rz~sna

This arsenal, occupied by a POW unit on

October 31, provided the Poles with weapons and uniforms.

15
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return expedition, however, did not reach Lw6w until November 4.46
This action of occupying a few villages west of Lw6w also protected
the Polish outposts from Ukrainian assaults from the west that could
have trapped the Poles in a hopelessly small area of the city.
In other parts of East Galicia, the Ukrainians easily occupied
nearly all of the cities.

One exception was the previously mentioned

fortress city of Przemysl, which had been occupied at the end of
October by Polish forces under General Puchalski.

Colonel Vitovskyy

ordered a local Ukrainian regiment to attack Przemysl and, "at any
cost," destroy its railway link with Lw6w by blowing up the bridges
on the San River (running through przemysl).47

The Ukrainians

succeeded in taking hold of the city and capturing General Puchalski.
However, before the Ukrainians could destroy the crucial bridges, a
swift counterattack by Polish forces under Colonel Sikorski allowed
the Poles to secure the railway link with Lw6w.

48

By the end of

November I, the Ukrainians controlled all of East Galicia from the
Zbrucz (in the east) to the San (in the west), while the Poles were
only in command of the western edge of Lw6w and several villages a
few kilometers west of that city.
On the morning of November 2, the Polish forces, with only 176
rifles to their disposal, began an assault directed at the Central
Railway Station on the western borderline of Lw6w.

While two Polish

units attacked the station itself, a third unit was successful in
capturing the station's enormous armaments warehouse.

There the Poles

found over 12,000 up-to-date Mannlicher rifles with over two million
pieces of matching ammunition. 49 . Thanks to the new supplies, the
Poles were able to intensify their attack on the Central Station,
which they captured in the late evening hours.

The Poles also

captured the 'dragoons' barracks in the southwestern district of Wulka
16
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where another 2000 rifles and several machine guns were taken.

50

After repelling attacks on their positions in western Lw6w, the Poles
counterattacked, storming towards the center of the city.

Despite

having the initiative, the Polish command was persuaded by the Polish
National Committee to agree to a temporary truce with the Ukrainians.
This truce proved to be somewhat of a victory for the Ukrainian
Army, since it was reinforced the next day by 2000 Sich Sharpshooters
(USS) from Bukovina.

51

TheUSS was the Ukrainian elite fighting 'unit,

composed of experienced soldiers filled with patriotic Ukrainian
fervor.

The ffi,rainian Army desperately needed reinforcements, since

the Ukrainian soldiers recruited from the Austro-Hungarian Army were
increasingly deserting and heading for their homes in East Galicia.
On November 3, the fighting resumed.

52

A USS batallion attacked the

Central Station that evening, momentarily occupied it, but was forced
out by the next morning.

The Ukrainians were successful in capturing

the Polish radio station in Persenk6wka (south of Lw6w).
lost their only contact with Warsaw, Krak6w, and
they were appealing for help.53

The Poles

Przemy~l,

to which

The Poles, however, captured the

airport in northwestern Lw6w, where a half dozen Polish pilots, led by
Lieutenant Stefan Bastyr, began preparing five airplanes they found
there for battle.

These airplanes were used by the Poles not only for

dropping bombs on Ukrainian positions, but especially for reconnaissance
purposes.

Of greater significance was the fact that the airport also

functioned as the Poles' only means of contact with the outside world.
The fiercest fighting for Lw6w came on November 4.

The Ukrainian

forces launched a determined, but unsuccessful, attack against Polish
positions in the district of Wulka, especially the,Cadet School. 55
The Poles, meanwhile, advanced dynamically towards the center of the
city.

They seized the main Post Office and other bUildings adjacent
17

54

I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I

to the Citadel, the Ukrainians' major stronghold.

Polish forces also

occupied and set up defensive positions on G6ra Stracenia, i.e.
Execution Hill (named for the executions of Polish patriots by
Austrian authorities that took place here in 1846).

Moreover, the

Ukrainians were forced to retreat from the northern suburb of
.Zamarstyn6w.

By the end of November 4, the city of Lw6w was almost

evenly split into two equal parts between the warring sides.
Ukrainians' only success that day lay outside of Lw6w.
Ukrainian detachment successfully occupied all of

The

A 300-man

Przemy~l,

pushing

the meager Polish forces there back to the west bank of the San.

56

On November 5, the Poles launched an unsuccessful assault on the
Citadel.

This complex of fortifications proved to be a thorn in the

Polish Army's side for the duration.of the November battle for Lw6w.
Rising high above the surrounding area, it was used by the Ukrainians
to bombard nearby Polish positions with deadly effectiveness.

In the

meanwhile, Ukrainian attacks on the Cadet School that day also failed.
While the first five days of the struggle for Lw6w were based on
military engagements for large and strategic areas of the city, the
next several days can be characterized as a positional battle, where
each side attempted to capture individual buildings or streets, as well
as the villages around Lw6w.

Both warring parties established a front

line with barricades which ran just west of the center of Lw6w's
downtown section.

On November 9, with the assistance of a newly

constructed armored car, Mlczy6ski launched an attack on the
Ukrainian positions in the center of Lw6w.

The armored car broke down

and the Polish forces were faced with severe machine gun and artillery
fire from the Citadel and other Ukrainian positions.

This attack, as

well as a simultaneous one attempted from Execution Hill and one
aimed at the Citadel, yielded little effect and the Poles were forced to
18
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~etreat.

A

Ukr~inian

counterattack also failed, and the front line

between the two armies remained relatively the same.

S7

Both armies

were satisfied with just shelling each others' positions in the next
few days.
While the front remained static, developments on the Ukrainian
pol i tical scene were very ac tive.

>

On November 9, the Ukrainian
>

National Council (UNR) established a provisional government under the
name of the State Secretariat and the presidency of the National
Democrat Kost Levytskyy.

On November 13, a temporary Ukrainian

constitution was adopted by the UNR, establishing the Western Ukrainian
National Republic.

Levytskyy was obligated by the UNR to "make all

necessary arrangements for the unification of all Ukrainian territories
into one state."S8
A Western Ukrainian delegation led by Osyp Nazaruk appealed for
military support from the Skoropadskyy government in Kiev, but none
would arrive.

By the November 11 Armistice agreement with the Entente,

the German Army was obligated to evacuate the formerly Russian
territories it had occupied.

This left Skoropadskyy without protection

from his German benefactors.

On November 14, Skoropadskyy issued an

official declaration calling for a federative union of Ukraine and
Russia and named Sergey Gerbel, a Russian monarchist, as the new
Ukrainian Prime Minister.

The independence-minded Ukrainians

immediately revolted under the leadership of the Social Democrats
Symon Petlyura and Volodymyr Vynnychenko.

Skoropadskyy would

eventually lose the struggle with Petlyura and Vynnychenko and flee
to Germany, but not until December of 1918. 59
The Poles in East Galicia were slightly more successful in
receiving help from their countrymen.

19
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expedition of about 500 troops, marching from Krak6w under the command
of Major Julian Stachiewicz, attacked the Ukrainian garrison in
Pr zemysl (consis ting of approximately' 1000 men).

By the next day,

the Poles were in control of Przemysl and its railway link with Lw6w.

IV.

The Deciding Struggle:

60

November 13-22, 1918

On November 13, Ukrainian forces launched a determined offensive
against Polish positions in Lw6w.

Colonel Hnat Stefaniv, the new

fficrainian commander (Vitovskyy was appointed Secretary of Military
Affairs in the UNR's State Secretariat), realized that with the
capture of Przemysl by Polish forces, he needed to destroy the Polish
Army in Lw6w before they could be reinforced from that fortress city.
The main Ukrainian thrust was once more directed at the Cadet School
and dragoons' barracks in the Wulka region.

61

The Ukrainians also

attempted to break through the Polish defenses north of Kulpark6w
(a village just southwest of Wulka).

The Polish detachment here,

under the command of Captain Mieczyslaw Boruta-Spiechowicz,
successfully withstood the attack.

With reinforcements from

Zamarstyn6w (northern Lw6w), Boruta-Spiechowicz ordered a counterattack
that pushed the Ukrainian forces out of Kulpark6w.

62

The Ukrainian

assault on Wulka also failed, but a Ukrainian detachment occupied
Zamarstyn6w, which had depleted its Polish defensive units by sending
reinforcements to the south.

63

On November 14, the Ukrainian forces renewed their assault.
Attacking from the north, they succeeded in surrounding Execution
lIill, which the Polish command decided to immediately reinforce with
all available units.

64

Execution lIill

The Poles repelled the Ukrainians from around

.

and were able to regaln Zamarstyn6w.

20
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15th to the 17th of November, the Ukrainian command concentrated all
of its offensive military efforts on the southwestern district of Wulka,
particularly the battle-torn dragoons' barracks and Cadet School.
With the fall of the Cadet School and. its shield from the southwest,
the dragoons' barracks, the core of the Polish defenses would be
exposed in western Lw6w, leaving the Poles in a desperate situation.
The Ukrainian forces came closest to their.objective on the night of
November 16-17.

They broke through the first Polish line of defense

and reached the walls of the Cadet School.

There, however, they were

repulsed by Polish machine gun fire from the school's windows.
A Polish counterattack allowed the Poles to occupy Ukrainian positions
south of Wulka, from which the Ukrainian Army had been staging attacks
on the Cadet School and dragoons' barracks.

66

The Polish counterattack

was the last military action of the next four days.
At 3 o'clock in the afternoon of November 17, Polish and Ukrainian
negotiators signed a 48-hour truce
on November 18.

which was to take effect at 6 a.m.

The cease-fire was later extended with an expiration

date of November 21 at 6 a.m.

This truce was definitely in the

Poles' favor, who were already preparing for the arrival of
reinforcements from Przemysl.
were also in need of rest.

The Ukrainian forces, nevertheless,

Soldiers on both sides were utterly

exhausted from the non-stop fighting.
The Poles in Warsaw were now prepared to lend their countrymen in
Lw6w some military support.
political scene of Poland.

This was due to a drastic change in the
On November 9, the Germans released J6zef

Pilsudski from the Magd~burg prison.

The Polish Military Organization

(POW), in light of Pilsudski's release and Germany's defeat in World
War I, began to disarm the 30,000 German troops in Warsaw on
November 11.

67

On November 14, the Regency Council dissolved itself,
21
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transferring .civil and military rule in Poland to Pilsudski.

Four

days later, Pilsudski nominated a prominent Socialist and East
Galician Pole,

J~drzej

Moraczewski, as Prime Minister of the fully

independent Republic of Poland.

On November 16, in response to

numerous petitions and pleas from all regions of Poland, Pilsudski
ordered General Boleslaw Raja in Krakdw to lead a group of four
infantry regiments, a cavalry regiment, and three artillery batteries
to Przemysl in order to "prepare the relief of LW6w.,,68
General Raja had already taken the initiative in Krak6w by
sending a forward detachment to Przemysl under the command of
Lieutenant Colonel Michal Karaszewicz"Tokarzewski, a talented former
officer of the Polish Legions and a native of Lw6w.

Tokarzewski's

expedition to Lw6w consisted of 140 officers and 1228 other soldiers.
Adding to this the Polish military force already in Lw6w, the total
amount of Polish troops before the deciding battle for Lw6w consisted
of 3024 infantrymen and sixty-five cavalrymen.

The Ukrainian Army

in Lw6w, on the other hand, was made up of 3300 soldiers.

70

Tokarzewski's detachment, protected by an armored train, arrived in
Lw6w's Central Station on the afternoon of November 20.
Captain M9 czynski, along with his deputy commanders, had already
planned an all-out Polish attack that was to commence as soon as the
cease-fire expired on the morning of November 21.

This plan called

for a two-pronged maneuver meant to outflank the Ukrainian forces
from the north and south.

The bulk of the Polish forces, led by

Captain Boruta-Spiechowicz, was to occupy southern Lw6w and reach the
eastern district of

~yczak6w,

Ukrainian Army within Lw6w.

thereby trapping a major portion of the
The other major Polish detachment, under

First Lieutenant Walerian Sikorski prepared to take control of the
High Castle, the highest point in Lw6w and a illcrainian defensive
22
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stronghold.

.Here, Sikor ski was to join up· wi th Boruta-Spiechowicz

to close the circle around the IDcrainian forces in Lw6w.
Simultaneously to the flanking maneuver, two Polish detachments were
to simulate attacks on the center of the ·city and on the Citadel, in
order to hold down the enemy forces there and possibly trick the
Ukrainians into reinforcing these positions with troops from southern
Lw6w. 71
On November 21, Sikorski's attack from the northern district of
Klepar6w was stopped almost at its onset.

A Ukrainian counterattack

forced the Poles to defend their positions in Klepar6w and in the
neighboring Zamarstyn6w district. 72 Elsewhere, the Polish detachment
next to the Citadel was unnecessarily attempting to actually take
control of this fortress.

Despite heavy casualties, this Polish

assault succeeded in drawing Ukrainian reinforcements from the south. 73
In contrast to the setbacks in the north and at the Citadel,
Captain Boruta-Spiechowicz was vigorously advancing in the south.
After heavy fighting, the Poles occupied the tyczak6w Cemetery and
the tyczak6w Railway Station in southeast Lw6w. 74 The Ukrainians
immediately launched a counterattack from both the city and from the
village of Winniki east of Lw6w.

Both of these Ukrainian detachments

were pushed back, though during a second counterattack the Ukrainians
nearly regained the cemetery and railway station. 75
By nightfall, the Poles had failed to encircle the Ukrainian
positions and trap the bulk of their opponent's forces within Lw6w.
The Polish flanking maneuver was, nonetheless, the key to Poland's
victory in the battle for Lw6w.

The Ukrainian command now seriously

considered the possibility of being surrounded and cut off from the
rest of East Galicia by Polish forces.
withdraw from Lw6w.

The decision was made to

During the night of November 21,,22, the Ukrainian
23
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Army initiated a carefully organized retreat under the protection of a
few detachments that slowed down the pursuing Polish forces.

76

The

Poles were in control of Lw6w, though the rest of East Galicia
(excluding

Przemy~l)

was still in the hands of the Western Ukrainian

National Republic.
The battle for Lw6w in November of 1918 was a costly one.
Approximately 3000 people died during the struggle,77 both soldiers
and civilians.

Civilians, as in any urban battle, were especially

vulnerable to constant shelling and cross-fire.

Most of the civilian

casualties were Poles, since they constituted the majority of the
population.
The loss of LWDW was a bitter setback for Western Ukraine.

At a

time when the Ukrainians had the advantage in manpower and weapons,
when no united Polish Army existed outside of Lw6w, the Western
Ukrainian Army proved incapable of even denting the Polish defenses
in LWDW.

Starting in mid··November of 1918, with the establishment of

an independent and united Polish state and the organization of a
regular Polish Army, it was the Poles who took the military initiative
over a politically divided Ukraine.

Credit for the Polish victory,

nevertheless, lies solely with the volunteer soldiers of LWDW.

They

followed a Polish tradition of defending their besieged cities against
overwhelming odds dating back to the defense of Warsaw against Russian
and Pruss ian troops during the

Ko~ciuszko

Insurrection of 1794, and

later continued during the Warsaw Uprising against Nazi German
occupation in 1944.

In each case, pure determination and an

unbreakable sense of optimism allowed the Poles to defend their
territory longer than seemed possible.

However, unlike the tragic

Warsaw defenders of 1794 and 1944, the Poles of Lwbw in 1918 were

24
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able to obtain reinforcements from outside that tipped the scales
in their favor.
The struggle for Lw6w in November of 1918 has a legendary
standing in Polish history, and two terms are always associated with
it.

The first one is the city's official slogan, "Semper Fidelis,"

"Always Loyal" [to Polandl.
of Lw6w as the "Eaglets."

The second one refers to the defenders
This is because the majority of the Polish

soldiers who fought and died in the battle for Lw6w were below the
age of 24. 78
the age of 17.

Approximately 27 percent of those who died were below
79

very young men:

Even the commanding officers were predominantly
Lieutenant Colonel Tokarzewski (the commander of

the Polish forces in LWQW during the November 21 attack) was 25,
Captain

Boruta~Spiechowicz was

24, Lieutenant Laveaux (the chief

Polish negotiator with the Ukrainians) was 27, etc.

Tokarzewski and

Boruta-Spiechowicz would later become prominent military leaders in
Poland's struggle against Nazi German and Soviet Russian occupation
during World War 11.

80
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v.

Conclusion

The battle for Lw6w in November of 1918 did not decide the outcome
of the Polish-Ukrainian War.

It did, however, allow Poland to

maintain a foothold in East Galicia, forcing the Ukrainians to fight
on two fronts:

the front in Lw6w and the front on the western border

(i.e., the San River) of East Galicia.

Under Colonel Dmytro

Vitovskyy's mobilization program, the Ukrainian army grew to almost
100,000 troops,81 substantially more than the Poles could assemble for
several months.

The Poles in Lw6w were constantly in grave danger

from the surrounding Ukrainians, who on the night of December 28-29,
1918 almost broke through the Polish defenses into Lw6w.

82

The Western Ukrainian National Republic signed an agreement with
the Ukrainian People's Republic (now ruled by a five-man Directorate
led by Symon Petlyura and Vo1odymyr Vynnychenko) on December 1, 1918,
by which the East Galician Ukrainians decided to unite with their
countrymen east of the Zbrucz River.

Though the formal union did not

occur until January 22, 1919, the Directorate soon sent its own troops
to support the war against Poland in East Galicia.
The Poles were occasionally reinforced by detachments that had
to break through Ukrainian defenses on the eastern bank of the San
River, a bloody and difficult task indeed.

Polish attempts to conquer

more territory around Lw6w failed, leaving the Poles throughout the
winter of 1918··1919 in control of only the city of Lw6w and its
railway link with PrzemyA1.

In early March of 1919, the Ukrainian

command ordered another onslaught on Lw6w, which left the Polish
forces there in an almost desperate position.

A rescue effort by the

Polish Army from Przemy1l1 was again successful,83 as Tokarzewski's
expeditiop had been in late November of the previous year.
26
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In April of 1919, the strength of the armies pitted against each
other in East Galicia was as follows:

the Polish forces possessed

30,000 troops, while the Ukrainian Army was composed of 55,000
84 That same month, the Polish Army in East Galicia
soldiers.
increased substantially by the arrival of General J6zef Haller's Army
from France.

This Army had been preparing for battle alongside the

Entente forces during World War I, but the Armistice was signed
before this unit became fully organized.

It consisted of 68,433

soldiers, including 22,395 volunteers from the United States.

85

These volunteers were Polish-Americans and Poles living in the United
States, many of whom returned to the U.S. after the conclusion of the
Polish-Ukrainian struggle and the Polish-Soviet War (1919··1921).
On May 14, the Polish Head of State,. J6zef Pi1sudski, ordered an
offensive on the East Galician front, to be led by Haller.

The

Ukrainian Army was unable to impede the· Polish Army's progress,
which resulted in the Poles taking hold of a greater part of East
Galicia.

On June 8, in a sudden reversal of fortune,

the new

Ukrainian commander in East Galicia, General Oleksandr Grekov,.

.

initiated a successful counteroffensive against the Polish Army
through which the Ukrainians regained much of the territory they had
lost in the previous three weeks.

Since by this time both Poland

and especially Ukraine were threatened from the direction of Soviet
Russia, the number of soldiers fighting in East Galicia declined
substantially to support the Polish-Soviet and Ukrainian-Soviet
fronts.

The Polish Army in East Galicia, now

~nder

the direct command

of J6zef Pilsudski, was comprised of 38,613 infantrymen, 2144
cavalrymen, and 207 artillery pieces, compared to Grekov's Ukrainian
Army of 24,300 infantrymen, 400 cavalrymen, and 244 artillery pieces. 86
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By this time, the Western Ukrainians remained alone in their
quest for a Ukrainian East Galicia.

The Eastern Ukrainians, led by

Symon Petlyura, viewed the loss of the enormous area of eastern
Ukraine as a greater threat to Ukrainian independence than the Polish
presence in the relatively small East Galicia.

They were willing to

relinquish East Galicia and western Volhynia for a Polish-Ukrainian
alliance against Bolshevik Russia.

J6zef Pilsudski was very receptive

to this idea, since he himself had been arguing in previous months
for a Polish-Ukrainian federation that could resist the menace of

.
87
SOVl.et conquest.
Since Grekov did not sign on to Petlyura's efforts, Pilsudski
decided to push the Western Ukrainian Army out of East Galicia.

On

June 28, 1919, the Polish Army launched the decisive offensive of the
Polish--Ukrainian War, pushing Grekov' s Army fur ther and further east.
On July 17, the Western Ukrainian Army crossed the Zbrucz River.
of East Galicia was now under Poland's control.

All

In the end, the

Polish-Ukrainian War of 1918-1919 had cost the lives of 15,000
Ukrainian and 10,000 Polish soldiers.

88

On August 22, 1919, the Ukrainian People's Republic, under the
leadership of Petlyura, signed a peace agreement with the Republic
of Poland by which the Polish-Ukrainian border was established on the
Zbrucz River.

89

Petlyura's forces were soon forced out of Ukraine

by the Bolshevik Army and allowed to enter Poland.

On April 21, 1920,

Petlyura signed a military and political alliance with Poland (despite
objections from the East Galician Ukrainians) by which Ukraine
renounced its rights to East Galicia in exchange for active Polish
support of an independent Ukraine.

90

On April 25 of that year,

Polish forces under Pilsudski's direct command (along with the
remnants of Petlyura's Ukrainian Army) began a powerful offensive
28
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against the Bolshevik Army that was occupying Ukraine.
Polish Army captured Kiev,

After the

the Poles and Petlyura began organizing

a Ukrainian administration in the areas recovered from the Bolsheviks.
However, the Soviet counteroffensive that started in June of 1920
ended the Ukrainian dreams of an independent state.

Though the Poles

regained the upper hand in August after their brilliant victory
over the Bolshevik Army in the Battle of Warsaw, the Polish Army
was unable to continue its offensive into Ukraine.

The Polish-Soviet

Treaty of Riga, signed on March 18, 1921, established the border
between these two states, by which Poland kept East Galicia and the
western part of Volhynia (as far as the southeastern Polish border
is concerned).

The only officially independent Ukrainian state, the

Ukrainian Soviet Republic,

was de facto a part of Soviet Russia in

every aspect but on paper.

On

I~rch

14, 1923, the Conference of

Ambassadors (the former member countries of the Entente) recognized
the Polish borders in the east, thereby consenting to Polish rule
in East Galicia.
The relations between Poland and its Ukrainian minority were very
tense throughout the 1920's and 1930's.

The Ukrainians comprised

14 percent of Poland's population, the largest national minority in
.
91
the country.
Under the Polish Constitution of 1921, all Polish
national and religioys minorities were guaranteed equal rights and
proportional representation in the Polish par1iament.

92

This,

nonetheless, did not appease the independence--minded Ukrainians.
Many of them began to collaborate with either the German or Soviet
governments, both bitter opponents of an independent Poland.

The

close German-Ukrainian relationship resulted in intimate cooperation
between the German Nazis and the Ukrainian ultranationalists during
World War II.
29
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In September of 1939, the Soviets annexed East Galicia and
Volhynia in accordance with the Ribbentrop··Molotov Pact between Nazi
Germany and the Soviet Union.

When Germany occupied these provinces

in the summer of 1941, the Ukrainian nationalists became the Nazi
authorities' faithful servants.

A police force was established that

consisted entirely of Ukrainians.
"SS--Galizien" Division.

The SS organized a Ukrainian

The Organization of UkrainianNa tionalists

(OUN) , which had organized terrorist activities against Poland before
1939, was permitted by the Germans to form military detachments
result of this cooperation was horrendous.

The

It is estimated by both

Polish and Ukrainian historians that OUN, SS-Galizien, and the
Ukrainian police murdered at least half-a-million Poles in East
Galicia, Volhynia, and what is now southeastern Poland.

93

tncrainian

nationalists also assisted in the Nazi German plans to exterminate
the Jews.

Many of them served as death camp guards and executioners

(the recent case of the so-called "Ivan the Terrible" and John
Demianiuk is a well-known example), while the SS-·Galizien Division
was assigned by the German military command to massacre entire
districts and villages of Jews both in former Polish territory and
during the German invasion of the Soviet Union.
At the end of World War II, the Soviet Union annexed both Volhynia
and almost all of East Galicia, deporting the majority of its
Polish inhabitants to the new communist People's Republic of Poland.
The Ukrainians remaining within Polish borders were in the most part
deported to the Ukrainian Soviet Republic of the U.S.S.R.
Polish-Ukrainian relations have been friendly in the last few
years

When Ukraine proclaimed its independence on August 24, 1991,

Poland became the first country to recognize the new state.

The

first Ukrainian President, Leonid Kravchuk, later apologized to. the
30

I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I

Polish nation for the killing of half-a-million Poles by "Ukrainian
chauvinists.,,94

Unfortunately, in Lw6w (now officially Lviv) and

East Galicia, the newly rising ultranationalistic movement has become
very popular, even electing radical anti--Semitic and anti-Polish
representBtives to the Ukrainian

parli~ment.

Both Poles and Jews are

appalled when they see a Stepan Bandera Street in Lw6w and Bandera's
pictures being sold everywhere in the city as that of a national idol.
Stepan Bandera, it must be explained, was the DUN's leader during the
1940's and the chief architect of the Nazi-Ukrainian plan to
exterminate Poles and Jews in East Galicia and Volhynia.

On an

optimistic note, Ukrainians outside East Galicia are rather
sympathetic to the Poles, as the Poles are friendly to them.
Though few participants in the battle for Lw6w in November of
1918 are still alive today, the legend of the Lw6w Eaglets lives on
in Polish minds and hearts.

The Polish cultural traits of Lw6w can

be found everywhere in Poland.

The Poles do not wish to have another

conflict with the new Ukraine over Lw6w, but they at least hope the
remnants of Polish culture and history in Ukraine will be respected
and the Polish minority in East Galicia will not be discriminated
against, as is not the case at present.

The fighting for Lw6w may not

have been an event of tremendous proportion or world-wide stature.
It serves, nonetheless, the same purpose in Poland as the defense of
the Alamo does in the United States.

It provides heroes for a nation

from a group of simple volunteers, fighting for the right to something
they perceive as their own.

Often small victories (or even honorable

defeats) are more significant to a nation's pride than overwhelming
military triumphs.
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